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P R O D U C T  D IF F E R E N T IA T IO N  IN A U D I T  FIRMS
A B S T R A C T
This paper provides an explanation for the dif ferences  in products
supplied by audit firms. Auditees select auditors to lower the costs
of contracting to add value to the firm. The variat ions in the
contracts of  auditee firms induce a demand for diversity  in types of
audits. Audit firms develop specializations and maintain a
comparative advantage in audits of  portfolios of  auditees. Auditors
will be specialized according to common contracting attributes of 
auditees and will invest in factors suited to monitoring and
arbitrat ing with respect to those contracts. Auditor qual ity is
described within this context and reconciled with the general 
descriptions of  auditor qual ity which have appeared in the l i terature.  
Propositions with respect to audit pricing, auditor switching and
auditor investment st rategies  are developed and reconciled to the
available evidence.
1The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of why 
product d if ferentiat ion  exists in audit firms. The issue has arisen in a 
number of contexts,  such as:
(i) Attempts to explain the determinants  of auditor  choice.1
(ii) Assumptions underlying empirical results which show differences in 
prices charged by auditors to auditees,^
(iii) Regulatory invest igat ions of competition within the audit industry.3 
Despite the extensive empirical research on audit prices, relatively
little progress has been made in developing an explanation of how
uti lisat ion of particular audit products can be value increasing for the 
auditee firm. The most consistently adopted approach is that auditors
supply differing arrays of audit '’quality" in response to the heterogeneous 
demands for quality which are genera ted  by different  auditee agency costs,
[see e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Dopuch and Simunic, 1982; De Angelo, 
1981a, 1981b; Palmrose, 1984; De Fond, 1987; Simunic and Stein, 1987; 
Francis and Wilson, 19881. Within this explanation, the supply of auditor 
"quality" emerges from, and is underwrit ten by, investments of the audit 
firm in reputat ion for supplying a particular  "quality" level.
An a l ternat ive explanation of product d if ferentia t ion  is that auditors 
develop technological specialization in response to specific differences 
between industries [Arnet t  and Danos, 1979; Shockley & Holt, 1983; 
Eichenseher and Danos, 1981] or their operat ing environment [Eichenseher, 
1984]. Observation of aud i to r -aud itee  behavior suggests both explanations 
have some relevance and some at tempts have been made to in tegrate the 
explanations [e.g., Palmrose, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Johnson and Lys, 1988]. 
However, the absence of a general theory with the capacity to explain the 
structure of audit markets  and product d if ferentia t ion  in auditing has made
2reconciliation of the explanations difficult. This paper is an at tempt to 
partial ly fill that void.
The central  thesis of this paper is that observed specialization by 
auditee firms is a function of eff icient contracting to combine factors of 
production and consequently observed differences in the output of audit 
firms is derived from differences in auditee at tr ibutes.  Section I provides 
an explanation of the nature of the auditee firm where contracting between 
various claimholders is costly. This analysis is derived from the works of 
Coase [1937], Alchian [1984] and Ball [1988]. It is argued in section II 
that,  consistent with prior research, since accounting and external  auditing 
are integral  components of contracting in the auditee firm, they derive 
many of their propert ies  from auditee firm at tr ibutes.  Section III develops 
an explanation of the demand and supply of audit quality and the 
relationship between audit product quanti ties ,  audit quality and the structure 
of audit markets  and the section provides an explanation about how 
auditees and audit firms opera te  in response to changes in auditee demand
for audit products. Section IV examines the extent to which
propositions about audit quality developed in the earl ier sections of
paper are reconcilable with principal findings of the audit pricing l i terature.  
Section V provides summary conclusions.
I. CONTRACTING AND FIRM PRODUCTION-INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
Coase [1937] provides a positive theory for the existence of firms. 
Firms exist as intermediaries between factor  and consumer markets and the
survival of the firm is dependent on its ability to genera te  output
consistent with demand preferences of consumers and at a lower cost than
if those consumers were to deal with the owners of factors directly. Firms 
consist of combinations of factors and managers, in seeking to increase the
3value of factors within the firm, are faced with decisions about the type
of output to be produced and the combinations of specific factors required
for that production (i.e., production-investment decisions). The comparative 
advantage of the firm in contracting depends upon the specialized value 
particular factors can bring to the firm and the efficiency with which the
utilisat ion of those factors are determined.  The contracting solutions that 
bind these factors are critical and determine ult imately the value of the 
combination and the marginal value of each factor. The firm is defined by 
its comparative advantage in contract ing4 with claimholders owning the 
factors, compared with the costs faced by consumers in resort ing directly to 
markets  to purchase those factors.
Factor  Specificity
For the firm, the value of any factor  of production is defined with
respect to the dependency of the other factors on that factor. This 
concept of factor  (resource) specificity [Alchian, 1984] provides insights into 
understanding the operat ion of the firm. Claimholders contract to rent 
their  factor  property rights in return for an income stream. Cheung [1983, 
p. 4] describes the necessary conditions in contracting for the private 
property rights to factors:
Any productive input is a private property if, within well -  
defined limits, its owner has (1) the right to exclude others so 
that he alone may decide on its use, (2) the right to extract 
exclusive income from its use, and (3) the right to t ransfer  the 
property (including labour) to or to exchange with anyone he 
sees fit. The right to exchange implies the right to contract,  
and property rights may be transacted through a wide variety 
of contractual  arrangements.
Individual claimholders share in a s tream of q u a s i - r e n t s 5 dependent 
on the continued existence of the coalition of factors that  consti tute the 
firm. Should any factor  withdraw from the coalition, both firm value and 
remaining factor  values fall. Consequently, the g rea te r  specificity of a
4factor, the g rea te r  will be the loss of quas i - ren ts  to the firm when the
factor  exits the firm and the g rea te r  will be the costs of recontracting to
restore the quas i - ren t  s tream [Ball, 1988, p.14]. A direct implication is that 
the firm will demand long- term contracts  with owners of factors of high
specificity to minimize disruption and increase the expected value of the 
stream of quas i - ren ts  [Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Alchian, 1984; 
Alchian and Woodward, 1986; Williamson, 1985].6
Efficient Contracting with Factors
Factor specificity by itself  is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
to describe contracting via the firm. In addition, the firm must be
efficient with respect to writing contracts with claimholders to share in the 
value crea ted  by the firm vis a vis the contracts  consumers would write in 
dealing with claimholders directly. Coase [1937] identified this condition. 
He argues that the firm emerges because of its efficiency in organizing 
production through the price system and in particular  "... discovering what 
the relevant  prices are" [Coase 1937, p. 390].
In the context of production-investment decisions by firms, assembling
factors requires knowledge of the specificity of any factor  in order that an 
optimum contract  is writ ten.  To the extent  that  any factor  purchaser has
an advantage in the revelation of specificity, the purchaser is afforded an 
advantage in markets  through reductions in contract ing costs. In
anticipating production of a certain output, the specificity of a factor will 
be rela ted to the expected behavior of the factor  in the anticipated
coalition, availability of the factor  through time and, expected variabili ty in 
both the at tr ibu tes  and price of the factor.
A variety of mechanisms exist for purchasers to identify factor
specificity and each mechanism differs in its accuracy and cost [Caves and
5Williamson, 1985, p. 115]. However, following Coase [1937], the firm is in 
a unique position with respect to these search costs because of what are 
described as economies of scale in repeti t ive contracting [Ball, 1988 pp. 5 -  
7]. The firm as a frequent purchaser of factors is more likely to utilize a 
decreasing cost function for identifying factor  specificity. Consumers with 
"once only" or infrequent  purchases, cannot avail themselves of these 
economies. Consequently, the nature of the firm is dependent  upon the
marginal value added to a coalition by a successive factor  and the cost of 
identifying the specificity of the factor to the coalition.
11 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTING AND EXTERNAL AUDITING
The Demand for Accounting
The previous section advanced the proposition that firms exist as
efficient contracting intermediaries between consumer and factor  markets  and 
claimholders on the firm contract to receive a specific set of payoffs from 
surrendering specific factor  property rights. In this section it is argued
that accounting and external  auditing are integral  to contracting through 
the f irm10 and, since contracts  will vary across auditee firms, the nature of 
the at tr ibu tes  demanded in an external  audit will vary systematically with 
auditee at tr ibutes.
Payoffs to factors are uncertain and dependent  upon the revealed 
s ta tes  of the production-investment decisions of the firm which cannot be 
costlessly perfect ly prespecified. Consequently, there exists a demand for a 
payoff  technology, which consists of mechanisms that reveal  s ta tes  and 
thereby, the agreed total value added to the coalition as well as sharing 
rules in contracts which determine the respective claimholder payoffs.
The production of accounting information is one mechanism for
revealing s ta tes  ( [hereaf te r  described as accounting technology following Ball
6[1988, p. 19 ] ).11 Prior to performance of the contracts,  an accounting 
technology will be agreed to by the factors. Consistent with Alchian [1984,
p. 39], efficient technologies emerge to measure value added because of the 
difficulty of measuring output directly.
These technologies can rely upon "generally accepted" rules (to the 
factors) for revealing states. This does not necessarily imply that there 
will be "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) applied to all 
firms. General ly acceptable descriptions of s ta tes  can evolve by (voluntary) 
modification of GAAP in revealing s tates  or by production of sharing rules 
which effect ively undo GAAP in determining payoffs. In the absence of 
regulation, voluntary associations (e.g., professional accounting bodies) may 
exist as suppliers of "state revealing" technologies that have become 
accepted practice [Ball, 1988, p. 36].
Since costly contracting implies that contingencies may occur the 
accounting technology may be modified from the ex ante agreement to 
reflect unexpected s ta tes  including the effects of unexpected opportunistic 
behavior by claimholders as contracts are performed. Ex post adjustment to 
the accounting technology in these situations is an expected phenomenon.14
The Demand for External  Auditing
Given the existence of accounting as a payoff technology, the demand 
for external  auditing is derived from a demand to moni tor15 and arb i t ra te  
on the application of the accounting technology. Auditing is a specialist
function demanded within firms to faci li tate the completion of contracts 
[Ball, 1988, p. 30].
The demand for external  auditing in the firm will vary according to 
the ex ante specification of the accounting technology (including the ex 
ante agreed upon process for modification of that technology) in claimholder
7contracts  and the subsequent  reve lat ion of s t a t e s  [Ball, 1988, p. 32].16 
Where revea le d  s t a t e s  are  as expected,  the specific contract ing  provisions 
such as the account ing technology and the applicable shar ing rules, are  
implemented as the s t a t e s  arise. Accordingly, the audi to r  monitors the 
applicat ion of the con trac ted  for account ing technology according to the 
revealed s t a t e s . 17
However ,  given some uncert a in ty  in reve la t ion of s ta t e s , modif icat ion
of account ing technology can occur which implies that  the aud i to r  is
required to a r b i t r a t e 18 on the consis tency be tw een the s t a t e s as revealed
ex post by the account ing technology and the sharing rules incorporated in,
and implied by, the contract s  with claimholders. The choice of the
description a rb i t ra to r" in this con tex t  is de l ibera te . Where the number of
claimholders is large and diverse , the a rb i t ra t ion funct ion becomes more
valuable  since the cost of dete rmin ing  s e p a ra te  payoff s  to firm claimholders  
increases.  The audi to r  cannot  make an absolute  s t a t e m e n t  about  the value 
of payoffs  to any one factor  since, as we have argued above,  ne i the r  the 
con tracts  are  perfec t ly  specified nor is the account ing technology.19
Consequent ly ,  the audi to r  a rb i t r a t e s  on the account ing informat ion by issuing 
opinions as to its "fairness". "Fairness" in this sense means tha t  the
reve lat ions  of unexpected  s t a t e s  through the account ing informat ion  would 
be seen by the factors  to be cons is tent  with their  expecta t ions  of the 
reve lat ion  as if it had been an t ic ipa ted pr ior  to the performance of the 
cont ract s .20 Affec ted  pa r t ies  are  ident i f i ed and warned  by auditors  of
unfair  descr ipt ions in (for example)  "subject to ..." opinions and disclaimers 
[Ball (1988 p. 33)3.21
8HI PRODUCT DIFFEREN TIA TION IN AUDITING
The D i f fe r en t ia l  Demand for Audit Products
Following from the proposi t ion tha t  the demand for ex te rn a l  audit ing
is der ived  from a demand for monitoring and a rb i t r a t ing  on the applicat ion 
of a f i rm’s account ing technology, it is argued  in this sect ion tha t  the
demand for  audi to r  competence in the aud i t ee  contract s  and technical
competence in the appl icat ion of the audi tee  f i rm’s account ing technology is 
in turn,  der ived from this monitor ing and a rb i t r a t ing  role. In addit ion to 
contrac t ing  competence and technical  competence, ,  there  is a demand for 
audi to r  independence der ived  from the demand for  a rb i t r a t i n g .22 Moreover ,
we argue tha t  the geographical  locat ion of an aud i to r ’s offices  and
provision of n o n - a u d i t  services  are  importan t  in the eff ic ient  provision of 
the e x te rna l  audit .  The proposi t ion which emerges  from the section is that
the d i f f e re n t i a l  demand for these a t t r ib u t e s  by audi tee  firms is induced by 
the h e te rogene i ty  in the p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions of audi tees .
Cont rac t ing and Technical Competence
For any firm the p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions of tha t  firm 
de te rmine  its value. Consequently ,  the firm produces account ing information 
which reveals  the s t a t e  of the outcomes of those decisions. The tota l  
value added by the audi tor ,  given the a u d i t e e ’s p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  
decisions and the claimholder contracts ,  ' is dependen t  upon the accounting 
technology used in the account ing system and there  is a demand for a 
competent  aud i to r  to monitor  and a rb i t r a t e  within that  system. Audi tees  
demand of the audi to r  knowledge and expert ise  in: unders tanding  the way 
factor  con tract s  are w r i t t e n  to ex an te  limit oppor tunis t ic  behavior  by 
claimholders; ant i c ipat ing  and then monitoring the behavior  of the factors  in 
the implementa t ion of the p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions, and; a rb i t ra t ing
9upon the appropriateness of the accounting technology selected to reveal 
the states arising from those decisions.
Contracting competence can be distinguished from the demand for 
technical competence. Technical competence encompasses knowledge and 
expertise required in understanding the application of the accounting 
technology appropriate to the revelation of states (transactions) that have
occurred in addition to decisions with respect to audit techniques 
appropriate to monitoring and arbitrating the application of the accounting
te chn ol ogy .
The ability of an auditor to monitor and arbitrate the application of 
the accounting technology is conditional upon both knowledge and expertise 
in implementing the rules (be they GAAP or specific rules included in the
contracts). Most accounting rules (e.g., inventory valuation within GAAP) 
have some general application across firms and industries and, moreover, 
auditees can expect a minimum level of technical competence will be 
supplied by auditors who have satisfied mandatory registration requirements 
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.316].24 The level of technical competence
demanded is expected to vary with the volume, complexity and type of
transactions involving the auditee firms. For example, the level of
technical competence for auditing foreign currency transactions demanded by 
an auditee with overseas investments would increase with the frequency 
with which those transactions occur, the number of countries involved, the 
complexity of the interrelationships in accounting rules associated with these 
transactions and the introduction of foreign claimholders.
Independence
The demand for independence derives from the arbitration demand by 
claimholders as to the appropriateness of the determination of auditee
10
firm payoffs [Ball, 1988, pp. 31-321 . This includes reporting breaches
under the contract i.e. the accounting technology utilised does not provide 
an accurate revelat ion of the states.  This demand is g rea ter  where 
claimholders are less able to observe the s ta tes  as they are revealed and 
cannot part icipate in the process of negotiating the accounting technologies 
and ensuring the determination of appropriate payoffs to claimholders.
Proximity
Notwithstanding the demands for competence and independence, the 
costs of audits will be reduced ceteris  paribus, the closer the proximity of 
the auditor  to the auditee ’s offices and operations. The efficiency of the 
contracts between geographically dispersed claimholders is dependent upon 
the close proximity of the auditor. The higher agency costs associated with 
geographical dispersion of an aud itee ’s operat ions can be mit igated by the 
selection of an auditor  with geographically dispersed offices similar in 
distr ibution to the offices of the auditee. Apart from reductions in direct
costs associated with the audit such as aud i to r -aud itee  contact and audit 
technology applications, close aud i to r-auditee  proximity allows monitoring by 
the auditee with respect to the levels of competence and independence. 
Agency costs between auditor  and auditee may also be reduced by bonding 
arrangements entered  into by the auditor  to allow his general  reputat ion 
("community standing") to be more observable e.g., acceptance of honorary 
audits of chari table organisat ions or membership of s tandard set t ing 
authorities.
Provision of Non-Audi t  Services
Auditees can demand other services closely aligned with the demand 
for auditor  contracting and technical competence e.g., advising auditees about 
choices of accounting methods, suggesting financing decisions and liaising
11
with regulators. The knowledge and expert ise required to provide these 
services is dependent,  in part,  on industry specific and firm specific 
knowledge required in the provision of audit services [Danos and 
Eichenseher, 1988], Less directly associated, but still dependent  in part 
upon the knowledge and expert ise of auditee production-investment decisions 
are non-audit  services such as tax planning and designing and evaluating 
control systems, solvency and liquidation services, and recruitment services. 
Auditees expect that the spillover of auditor  knowledge and expertise in
contracting and technical matters  reduces the costs of the non-audit  
services when the services are jointly supplied ISimunic and Stein, 1987, 
p.9].
Non-aud it  services may also be valuable to auditees in reducing the
costs of contracting between claimholders in particular situations. For
example, analysis and design of systems of internal  controls are aimed at 
improving monitoring within the firm and lowers the costs of contracting 
through the firm. An auditee concerned about tax implications of financing
production-investment decisions would value more highly the services of the 
audit firm familiar with the particular  production-investment decisions than 
one which is not so familiar. The availability of non-audit  services from
the incumbent auditor reduces search costs borne by auditee management
“7.fiwhen seeking to acquire non-audit  services [Simunic & Stein, 1987, p. 9].
Production of Audit Quality
Our central proposition is that the d ifferential  demand for audit 
products is derived from the at tr ibutes  of auditees. This section describes 
aspects of the production (supply) by audit firms of contract ing competence, 
technical competence, independence, proximity and non-audit  services and 
explains the role of brand names in auditor  selection. The section then
12
offers an exp lanat ion  about  how aud i t ees  and audit  firms respond to 
changes in the demands of  auditees .
Optimal a u d i t o r - a u d i t e e  contract ing  would imply tha t  the incumbent
auditor is the least  cost suppl ier of the audi t products  to any aud i t ee  and
the arguments  to this point suggest  the cost is a funct ion of p roduct ion -
investment decisions of the audi tee ,  the special isat ion of the audi to r  and
the comparat ive  advan tage  of a l t e rna t ive  monitoring and a rb i t ra t ing
mechanisms. An implication of the argument  is that  the expec ta t ion  of the 
audi tee is tha t  the aud i to r  will remain the leas t  cost suppl ier of audi t
technology through time even when p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions of the
auditee may change. For  the audi to r  to maintain this comparat ive 
advantage  to any par t i cu la r  audi tee ,  it may be necessary for the audit  firm 
to invest in new and d i f fe ren t  productive factors .  Fai lure  by the audi tor  
to so adapt ,  can resul t  in the loss of the compara t ive  advan tage  in the 
supply of the audit  and rep lacement  by ano th er  audi to r  who has invested in
the requi red  factors  to supply the audit  product  a t t r i b u t e s  demanded as a
consequence of p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  changes and who charges a lower price 
for the audit .
The problem of adapt ion  is complicated by the audi to r  holding a 
portfol io  of audi tees .  Changes for one audi tee  may provide an insufficient 
inducement  for  the audi to r  to invest in an expanded set of product ive
factors. The e x te n t  to which the audi to r  an t i c ipa tes  the changes in the 
aud i t e e ’s decisions, the expected  returns  and the costs of invest ing in the 
new factors  will be importan t  considerations. The inves tment  in technology 
is made by the audi tor  only to the e x ten t  that  it is expected to be value
increasing for the audit  firm and these fac tors  would combine as
de te rminants  of expected  value.
13
In order to maintain the comparative advantage in the supply of an 
audit, the auditor  must correct ly anticipate the shifts in production-
investment decisions of the auditee. This argument is not to say that
auditors are forced to anticipate shifts in the absence of information. 
Since the existing audit will involve monitoring and arbi trat ing  investments
in new projects and payments to factors (including consumption by the 
manager), the details of the firm’s prospective production-investment
decisions will often be revealed to the auditor. In other  words, in
monitoring and arb i trat ing resource flows, the incumbent auditor  is able to 
request information of management in the conduct of the audit.
Additionally, if costs of switching auditors are large, the auditee may signal 
plans directly to the incumbent auditor. Also possible is that the 
incumbent auditor could influence both the type and number of production-
investment changes by their auditees via the supply of non-aud it  advice.
Investments in Fixed and Variable Factors
The audit production process requires investments in human capital 
(knowledge and expert ise) and non-human capital (equipment and offices) by 
the audit firm. Within both human and non-human capital,  the production 
process may be executed with both fixed and variable factor  investments.
As with firms in general,  audit firms face a t radeoff  between the 
fixed and variable components of their production function. Investment in 
fixed factors implies investment in a resource with an upfront outflow of
cash and the expectat ion of particular economies of scale and scope that 
are subsequently reflected in lower variable audit costs. In contrast , the 
auditor in contracting with variable factors avoids the fixed investment but 
faces higher variable costs with respect to the resource. Consistent with 
the explanation developed earl ier  (i.e. auditor  at tr ibutes  are derived from
14
auditee attributes),  auditors would not be indifferent  about their  choices 
between these types of factors in supplying ei ther (or all of) contracting 
competence, technical competence, independence, geographical proximity and 
non-audit services depending on demands within the auditors present or 
anticipated auditee base. Moreover, we will argue that an interdependency 
between these auditor at tr ibutes  exists such that a change in the mix of 
fixed and variable factors for the supply of one of these at tr ibutes  will 
have spillover effects  to the supply of other at tr ibutes.
The relationship argued to exist between production-investment 
at tributes of the auditee and the demand for contracting competence implies 
that contracting competence will be a necessary condition for the auditor  to 
be the efficient supplier. Furthermore,  an increasing demand for contracting 
competence by an auditee implies that  the auditor  will invest in specialized 
human capital with knowledge and expert ise in the factor  contracts and 
related production-investment opportunities  of the auditee. In making the 
decision to invest in fixed or variable factors, to meet the variat ion in this 
demand, the auditor  will be increasingly more likely to select fixed factors, 
such as selecting and writing long- term contracts  with a team of s taff  
having the requisite requirements,  than to select variable factors e.g, hiring 
staff as consultants. Auditees that become more specialized in their 
production-investment opportunit ies are likely to be facing increasingly 
complex accounting and non-accounting problems and possibly an increasingly 
difficult regulatory environment. The value of the auditor  to the auditee 
in these circumstances will be dependent  upon the timeliness of the 
auditor’s response to the problems. This in turn implies that  the auditor 
has available specialized personnel when auditee "problems" arise. In 
contrast, if the auditor  at tempts to address this "flexibility" demand of the
15
auditee by employment of only (lower specificity) variable factors (e.g. 
casual consultants) to avoid fixed costs, other  costs emerge. These costs, 
for example, would include monitoring borne by the audit firm in ensuring
that the consultant acts to maximise the value of the audit and the risk
that the consultant is not available when required.
The investment by an audit firm in a highly specific fixed factor 
means that any excess capacity must be utilized across other  audit 
engagements including providing non-audit  services to exploit any economies 
of scale or scope. In contrast , variable factors are not associated with 
scale economies where there are opportunities to utilise the excess capacity 
of a factor  from another supplier. With the specialized fixed factor, 
efficient utilization will be associated with auditees in the auditor’s
portfol io which are distinguished by commonalities in their  demand for this 
specialization. If investment in fixed factors is required to at tain
increasing contracting competence it will be unlikely that there will be any 
audit firm with a comparative advantage in the audit technologies for all 
types of production-investment decisions. There are limits to the process 
of investing in the range of audit technologies for all auditee production- 
investment opportunities because the investments in factors are in terrela ted  
(e.g. investments to maintain high levels of independence cannot be 
unbundled to supply low independence where this is demanded), and 
diseconomies of contracting arise with increases in the size and numbers of 
fixed factors of production.
Following our proposition that, the portfolio of auditees held by the 
auditor  will be specialized according to some common auditee production- 
investment decisions,27 larger  audit firms have the opportunity to utilize 
excess capacity following investments in fixed factors than do smaller firms.
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This opportuni ty  emerges because larger  firms will be specialized across a 
large number of audi tees  having commonali ty in their  p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  
decisions. The oppor tuni t ie s  for redep loyment  of  resources  is g r ea te r .  For 
example, if the demand for  a s tee l  industry specialist  within an audit  
firm’s aud i t ee  portfol io  falls, the contract ing  competence of the audi to r  may 
be ut il ized on manufactur ing  audi tees ,  par t icu la r ly  those who contract  for 
purchase or sale of s tee l  products.  Excess capaci ty of specialized human
capi ta l  can also be ut il ized by the provision of n o n - a u d i t  services. N o n - 
audit  services  are also dependen t  on contract ing  competence and with fixed 
costs of human capi ta l  sunk against  the provis ion of the audit ,  the marginal  
cost of providing some n o n - a u d i t  services  by la rger  firms may be low. 
Additional eff iciency associated with n o n - a u d i t  services  may also arise 
because of the large fixed investment  in learning the firm specific 
a t t r ib u t e s  of large audi tees  -  again these costs are sunk against the audit  
and lower the cost of provis ion of o the r  (non -aud i t )  services.
While t radi t ional ly  the audi ting research  l i t e r a tu r e  has ques t ioned the 
issue of audi to r  independence where there  is joint  supply of audit  and non ­
audit  services,  the value of a pa r t icu la r  aud i to r ’s r epu ta t ion  for
independence in conduct of the audit  ensures  audi t firms are care fu l  not to 
erode the value of  this a t t r ibu te .  Audit firms typically a rr ange  their
organisat ions to p ro tec t  this independence r epu ta t ion  by establishing 
separa te  divisions yet allow s ta f f  t rans fe rs  b e tw een  divisions (to util ise 
excess capaci ty),  which fac i l i ta tes  in te rnal  ’’t rading" of the competence but 
at the same time s epara te s  specialized personnel  providing the audit  
technology from those providing the n o n -au d i t  services. Consis tent  with
protect ing  inves tment s  in independence,  audit ing divisions are  run as 
pa r tnerships  whereas  management  consult ing arms are  typically
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* 28incorporated. In this sense partners in auditing provide a larger
collateral bond than they otherwise would if the audit firm were
incorporated.
The general proposition that emerges from this section is that 
increased investment in highly specific fixed factors to supply specialized 
contracting competence to auditee firms is related to increased investments 
by audit firms to supply larger quantities of other products as part of, or 
in association with, the audit. The proposition effectively articulates the 
reasons for the relationship between audit firm size, provision of joint audit 
products and audit quality which is frequently offered as an underlying 
assumption in the literature [see for example Palmrose 1986, Healy and 
Lys, 19861.
Audit Quality, Quantity and Brand Name
Our propositions suggest a schema which reconciles the not well 
understood relationship between quantities of audit products and the quality 
of those products. The separation of the different product demands of 
auditees within the audit product imply that the auditor’s production 
function will be multidimensional and audit quality can be related to 
increases in quantity along each attribute. This proposition represents an
application of the proposition developed initially by Lancaster [19661. In 
effect, by increasing the quantity of any attribute ceteris paribus within 
the product, the quality of the product rises. Simunic and Stein [1987]
have also applied Lancaster’s proposition to auditing. Under this approach 
a specific brand or a product of a specific audit quality demanded is
defined with respect to a vector of quantities of particular characteristics
• • 29it contains.
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A diff icul ty  associated with audits  is that  observa t ion  of qual i ty  with 
respect to competence  and independence and th e r e fo r e  credible  assurances in
this regard  are  diff icul t  to provide. An asymmetry exists  in the 
information set  b e tw e en  the audi to r  and aud i t ee  with respect  to the abil ity 
of the aud i to r  to observe the s ta tes ,  judge the "fairness" of the account ing
technology applied to revea l  those da tes  and to then repor t  where the 
accounting technology does not support  such a view. For  o the r  types of 
economic goods ex ante  observabi l i ty  diff icul t ies  with respect to qual i ty  are 
overcome by provis ion of gua ran tees ,  w ar ran t ie s  etc. [Barzel,  1982; Klein 
and Leff l er ,  1981]. These mechanisms op e ra t e  e ff ec t ive ly  because qual i ty  is
revea led  on consumption of the good. However ,  if the audi to r  has not 
been competen t  or fails to repor t  where the account ing technology is
inappropr iate ,  these outcomes are  not revea led  with production of the audit  
report  (i.e. the asymmetry persists).  Ex post,  observa t ion  of qual i ty  is
limited to cases  where the exis tence of incompetence/lack of independence is
revea led by legal act ion against the audi tor  [Kellog, 1986; Simunic and 
Stein, 1987, p. 20; Palmrose,  1988]. The court s ’ p reparedness  to rule 
against audi tors  in legal actions acts as a d e t e r r a n t  to audi tors  reducing 
the levels of required  competence and independence.  Fu r the rmore ,  in
decisions by the courts,  negl igence due to independence or incompetence is 
rarely di s t inguished adding support  for the claim that  independence and 
competence are  closely t ied and there  appears  to be l i t t le  benefi t  for  the 
claimholder in making the separat ion.
Cons is ten t  with the argument  that  the select ion of an appropr iat e  
audi tor  reduces the costs  of contract ing,  in formation asymmetry about  
auditor  qual i ty  is reduced in the audi to r  select ion process because of
associations b e tw e en  observable  a t t r ib u t e s  of audi t firms and quali ty.  The
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l i terature  descr ibes two a t t r i b u t e s  of market  s t ruc tu re  in audi t ing that  are 
important  here; audit  firms are ca tegorized into industry special isat ion 
categories [Eichenseher  and Danos, 1981; Danos and Eichenseher ,  1988]31 as 
well being e i the r  a member of the "Big 8" or the "Non Big 8".32
Recogni tion of the audit  firm as an industry special is t  brings some 
assurance of qual i ty  with respect to a contract ing  and technical competence 
in a class of p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decis ions.34 We have argued that  
assurances of qual i ty  with respect  to competence in a given special isat ion 
increase with the size of the audit  firm. The larger  firms have a g r e a t e r  
propensity to invest in highly specific fixed factors  to supply contract ing 
and technical  competence because excess capacity can be used more
eff iciently ( than smaller  firms) due to the la rge r  audi tee  base with 
commonali ties in the aud i t ee  p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions. Moreover ,  
because of the in te r re la t ionsh ip  be tw een  the investments  in f ixed factors 
associated with cont ract ing  competence and those associated with the o ther  
audit  products,  a l arger  audit  firm brings an assurance of higher qual ity 
with respect to supplying independence,  competence, proximity and n o n -au d i t  
services across a large number of auditees .  Big 8 audit  firms will 
therefo re  have a higher  r epu ta t ion  than do the smaller  audit  firms for a
• • , o cgiven industry specialisat ion.
Independence and competence are diff icul t  to sell to cla imholders  on 
the basis of management  (or auditor)  promises but,  on the o the r  hand, the 
value of competence and independence can be expected  to rise when the 
auditor  is able to bring some assurance of being a credible supplier  
( reputat ion).  It  would be expected  that  acquisi tion of r epu ta t ions  by audit  
firms would emerge  from factors  r e l a t e d  to signal ling competence and 
independence over  t ime such as avoiding lawsuits,  screening audi tees  to
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avoid explicit or implicit associations with low reputat ion directors or 
managers, avoiding ownership of audi tees’ stocks and avoiding trading on 
insider information available from auditees36.
Larger audit firms are expected to be more competent and
independent because the supply of a less than an expected level of 
competence and independence to any part icular  auditee will reduce the value 
of the audit firm across a larger number of auditees [De Angelo, 1981b]. 
As we previously note, other organizational relationships within audit firms 
also indicate an expected association between audit firm size and reputation.  
Audit firms are organized as partnerships and large audit firms have a 
large number of partners.  Consequently, a collateral  bond exists as 
insurance against any lack of competence and independence and the bond 
consists not only of the assets of the partnership and the par tne r ’s assets 
[Ng, 1978; Wallace, 1980; Benston, 1985] but also the par tne r ’s human 
capital [Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983] is tied to the firm’s reputation
and any reduction in audit firm reputat ion will reduce the value of the 
par tner’s human capital in the market for auditors. Furthermore,  Watts and 
Zimmerman [1986, p. 318] argue that with large firms, mutual monitoring of 
partners will increase as the reputat ion of the audit firm increases. Since
the organisat ion of audit firms means that the negligence of one partner  
may affect the assets of other  partners,  mutual monitoring between partners 
with respect to technical and contracting competence is expected. The 
implication of the argument is that,  ceteris  paribus, auditee contracting costs 
can fall when auditors are employed offering similar specialisations but with 
higher quanti t ies  of competence and independence (and there fore higher
quality).
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In summary, the suggestion here is that  the larger audit firms offer  
higher quality (relat ive to the smaller firms) because of their  larger
quantities of each and a]! of proximity (as reflected by the geographical
dispersion of audit firm offices), independence (as reflected in the larger
number of partners)  and non-audit  services as well as, within their defined 
specialisations, larger  quanti t ies of contracting and technical competence. 
However, within groups le.g., within the Big 8], audit firms are
heterogeneous (d ifferentiated) with respect to the supply of particular  types 
of contracting and technical competence in auditing classes of auditee
production-investment decisions. Some assurance of the difference in
competence is signalled via differences in brand name for auditee industry
specialisation. These arguments imply that switches between auditors of 
different  sizes are explained by at tempts to shift to different  quality 
auditors. Furthermore,  switches by auditees between Big Eight firms and
more generally switches between auditors of approximately equivalent size,
ceteris paribus, are not explained by at tempts to shift to higher quality 
auditors but, instead by demand for an auditor with a different
specialisation.
Auditor  Investment Strategies
We now turn to the issue of how audit firms can respond to changes 
in demands of auditees. Where there are expected changes in the
production-investment decisions for the auditee which are short run (viz., 
contracts which are wr i t ten with factors of low specificity) the auditor, if 
possible, will embrace variable productive factors to meet such changes.
However, if changes in production-investment decisions of the auditee are 
expected by the auditor  to be long run, the auditor will have to invest via 
long term contracts to supply the products demanded. The auditor  faced
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with expected shif ts  in audi tee  demand must an t ic ipa te  both the expected 
returns and costs of the investment  in technology.
Cl) The expected  returns  from an inves tm en t . While audi to r  antic ipat ion
of auditee  demand changes rep re sen ts  a necessary condit ion for opt imal  
investment by the auditor , because of portfol io  considerat ions,  it is not a 
sufficient condit ion.  Even though the value of fees  f rom an individual
auditee in the aud i to r ’s por tfo l io  may be expected  to rise in future  periods, 
the relat ive value of that  audi tee  in the portfol io  may fall  with the resul t  
that investment  s t r a teg ies ,  o ther  than which may be appropr ia te  for  a 
growing audi tee ,  may not be appropr iat e  across the audi tee  base. In short,  
the antic ipat ion of marginal  shifts  in p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions by 
other  audi tees  impacts on the rela t ive expected  weight  of any par t icu la r  
auditee  in the au d i to r ’s portfo l io  in future  periods.
(2) The expected  cost of the inves tm en t . Auditor  inves tments  can be
made via:
(2a) Fac to r  M arke t s . This inves tment  s t r a t e g y  involves the direct
purchase of factors  from their  respect ive markets ,  which are combined with 
existing fac tors  (if appropr ia te )  to provide the new products  a t t r ib u t e s
required. This s t r a t e g y  is one of inte rnal  growth [e.g., Alchian, 1984, p. 
35]. I n te rna l  growth  through the factor  marke ts  is a re la t ive ly  slow 
process compared to o the r  available  s t r a teg ies .  The na tu re  of these 
problems r e la te s  to our previous argument  about  ident i fying factor
specificity. I t  is possible that  audi tee  changes occur f a s t e r  than an audi tor  
can make the required inves tments  through inves tments  direct ly  in factor  
markets.  Moreover ,  some factors  (e.g., independence)  may not be directly  
available in these marke ts  which f u r the r  r e t a rd s  the inves tment  process.
Consequently it would seem tha t  this s t r a t e g y  is more likely to be used
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where the marginal cost of invest ing in the new factors  is low because 
the audit firm a lready holds o th e r  (underuti l ized) factors  required for the 
supply of the audi t  products.
(2b) Sub-Con t rac t ing  with O the r  A u d i t__ Firms. Contract ing
arrangements  may evolve be tw een  audit  firms with each reta in ing its
separate ident ity .  Sub-con tr ac t in g  a rr angements  may be such that  they 
allow e i the r  s e pa ra te ly  or  in combination:  a sharing of fixed costs (for
example, s t a f f  training); ut i l izat ion (pooling) of excess capaci ty  be tw een  
audit firms; or. the provision of a par t i cular  technology by an audi to r  when 
investment  in tha t  set  of factors  is not  just i f ied by expected  returns  from 
any par t i cular  aud i tee  or collect ion of audi tees .  The invest ing audi tor  may 
be able to acquire factors  which may not  be direct ly  available  f rom the
primary factor  marke ts  (e.g., those needed to supply independence) . Where 
the size of the client  base makes it infeasible to invest in fixed factors ,  
the sub -con t rac t ing  a l t e rn a t iv e  allows the possibi li ty of  short  run
investments  for low specificity variable  factors .  O ther  modifications of 
these sub -con t rac t ing  a r rangements  can evolve such as consort ium (a
federa t ion of audit  firms where the associate  firms use the one firm name 
unrelated to any of the pa r tne rs  in e i the r  of those firms). O ther  
character is t ics  can include joint deve lopment  of manuals and exchange in the 
use of offices,  yet  with each associate  firm reta in ing  autonomy in the
running of  i ts own operat ions.
A vari a t ion  of the consort ium a rr angem en t  is an associat ion of audit  
firms with one or two audit  firms dominating the association. The 
dominant  firm(s) provide specialist  advice on the sa te l l i t e  f i rms’ audits  and 
these firms, in re turn,  audit  the dominant  f i rms’ aud i t ees  in thei r  respective
geographical  locations. The sa te l l i te  firms use the s t a f f  t ra ining faci li ties
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of the dominant  firm. This form of association is s imilar  to a f ranchise
agreement. Franchise  agreements  in the re t a i l  product  marke ts  typically 
involve the franchisee contract ing  for the r ight  to use a na t iona l  firm
name, na t iona l  advert i s ing and na t iona l  t ra ining programs in exchange for a 
share of p ro f i t s  to the franchisor.  It would be expected tha t  a f e a tu re  of
the franchise agreement  would be provisions for the es tab l ishment  of 
quality control s tandards  and monitoring of performance of the franchisee.37
(2c) Mergers/Acquis i t ions. This inves tment  s t r a t e g y  involves
investing in factors  of production through ano ther  firm. The s t r a tegy  
results in combining of  aud i t ees  into a new portfolio .  A merger  be tw een  
firms is more likely where it is less costly for the par t i c ipa t ing firms to 
t rade in ternal ly  for the factors  requi red to provide the audit  products  to 
their aud i t ees  with the an t ic ipa ted  demand shifts.  The lower the costs of 
contract ing by t rading inte rnal ly  be tw een  the firms (compared to the costs
of cont ract ing  under a l t e rn a t iv e  investment  s t r a t e g i e s  such as sub­
contract ing),  the lower the costs of producing the audits  for the audi tees
undergoing these  changes.  Mergers (in general )  can also be associated with
economies of scale in production. A merger  investment  by an audit  firm
may involve addi t ional  investment  in fixed factors ,  and the audit  firm will
be placed in a posit ion where an increase in the aud i t ee  base (expected
fees) is s imultaneously associated with the increase of the f ixed costs. In
other  words, if the inves tment  is such tha t  the audit  firm now faces
decreasing unit  costs with successive outputs ,  a merger  fac i l i ta te s  increasing 
output  and at  the same time allows the firm to o f fe r  i ts product(s) at  
lower cost.
In adopt ing an investment  s t r a tegy ,  the possibi li ty exists  tha t  the 
auditor in seeking to maximize the value of the portfol io  of audi tees  held,
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may not correctly anticipate production-investment decision changes by any
auditee or group of auditees. The magnitude of the loss which is
experienced by the auditor  in these situations will be determined by
whether the costs imposed on the auditee will be sufficient to induce a
switch to another supplier and the extent  to which the incumbent auditor 
can replace this auditee with auditees demanding the auditor’s product 
at tr ibutes.  Also, the possibility exists that despite a failure of the 
incumbent auditor  to invest in factors in response to anticipated changes by 
the auditee (as the auditee would expect the auditor  to do), the auditor 
will remain the least cost supplier in that no other product offered in the 
market suits the auditee bet ter .  In other  words an auditee does not have 
the opportunity to unbundle the audit product of the auditor  into its 
product a t tr ibutes  to establish a configuration that maximizes the value of 
the audit.
IV PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND AUDIT PRICING
A number of propositions with respect to audit quality have emerged 
from the previous sections. Since a positive relationship between price and 
quality is expected [Klein and Leffler,  1981] our propositions should allow 
predictions with respect to audit prices in situations where dif ferent  audit 
quality is expected. Furthermore,  since a considerable body of pricing
li tera ture has now emerged, the extent  to which the evidence supports (or 
contradicts) our predictions can be considered.
The audit pricing l i te ra ture  has dichotomized audit firms into size 
categories (typically Big 8 and Non-Big 8) and tested  various hypotheses 
about fees charged by these firms to "large" and "small" auditees.  We have 
made the argument in this paper that Big 8 audit firms are expected to 
invest to supply grea ter  quanti ties of the audit products of contracting and
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technical competence, independence, non-audit  services and proximity within 
a given specialisation. In turn, the investment to supply each of these
at tr ibutes increases audit quality. In contrast , while smaller Non-Big 8 
audit firms will invest in factors to provide contracting competence for
their auditee base, it is unlikely that they will invest in the same 
quantities of the other  at tr ibutes,  particularly independence and proximity. 
As a consequence the quality of the audit offered by smaller Non-Big 8 
audit firms is lower than that for a Big 8 audit firm. Since none of 
these inputs are acquired costlessly Big 8 firms (compared to Non-Big 8 
firms), are expected,  on average to provide higher priced audits to auditees 
to reflect the higher cost of providing the audit.
Economies of scale considerations also affect this pricing proposition. 
We argued earl ier  that the supply of audit product at tr ibu tes  of Big 8 
firms is likely to be accompanied by Big 8 firm investment in fixed factors 
to reflect the auditee demand for an increasingly specialized audit product. 
Investments in fixed factors not only imply increasing auditor size but
shifts in the long run average cost curve, ceteris  paribus, downward and to 
the right reflecting the benefits  of economies of scale with a larger  
auditee base. Consequently, the benefi ts  of economies of scale are
expected to work in the opposite direction, and for large firms ceteris 
paribus this will reduce audit prices.
However, investments in factors for small auditors will not be
described by the same process. Small auditors will invest in fixed factors 
only so far  as investment in these factors can be recovered across the
auditee base of (typically) small auditee firms. The nature of the fixed 
factors will be different  as these auditors invest "from the bottom up" in
factors (e.g. computer equipment) suited to the auditee base. In contrast ,
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small auditees of Big 8 auditors share in the economies of investment in fixed factors from "the top down" in that the investments (for example, regional of fices and specialized personnel) are directed at large auditees. However,  when N o n - B ig  8 audit firms are forced to service large auditees they are expected to substitute variable factors and (compared with Big 8 auditors) will suffer  diseconomies of scale in provision of  these audits.Our predictions with respect to a comparison of expected prices between Big 8 and N o n -B ig  8 audit firms can now be summarised. With respect to large auditees, Big 8 auditors would command a higher price forprovision of higher quality audits than Non - B i g  8 auditors. However,economies of scale advantages of the Big 8 group in audits of largeauditees would operate to lower the price charged by Big 8 auditorscompared with the N o n -B ig  8 auditor group. Moreover,  diseconomies of scale arising from the necessity to invest in variable factors for large auditees and suffered by the small auditors in these audits would operate to raise prices for this group relative to provision by larger auditors.In the absence of information about cost functions for both groups of auditors it is di fficult  to hypothesize about the relative magnitude of each of these ef fects.  Consequently,  while it is expected that the price di fferential  earned by Big 8 auditors would be reduced because of the economies/diseconomies considerations, whether or not this difference between the two groups disappears completely can only be resolved empirically.The research evidence from the audit pricing literature suggests that price di fferences between Big 8 and N o n -B ig  8 auditors do not exist with audits of large auditees. The evidence indicates that for large companies (mean assets > SlOOmillion US) the large (Big 8) audit firms do not obtain
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a higher price than small (Non-Big 8) audit firms [Simunic, 1980; Simon, 
1985; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Stokes, 19861.
With respect to audits of small auditees, while the Big 8 price
difference for quality would remain, economies of scale from the
investments in fixed factors by both groups of auditors would opera te  with 
the effect that any price difference between the groups of audit firms
would be likely to remain. However, because larger auditors invest in 
fixed factors from "the top down", diseconomies of scale arise for larger  
auditors from their necessity to invest in variable factors for servicing
small auditees, and this would operate to raise prices for this group
relative to provision by smaller auditors. Whilst it is expected that the 
price differential  earned by Big 8 auditors would be reduced because of 
these considerations, as before, whether or not the price difference between 
the two groups disappears completely can only be resolved empirically. The 
research evidence suggests the price difference remains. For small
companies (mean assets < $100 million US) large (Big 8) audit firms do
obtain a higher price than small (Non-Big 8) audit firms [Francis, 1984;
• a o ,  ^ 9Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987 ].
Simon and Francis [1988, p. 263] report that,  across these studies, the 
prices of Big 8 audit firms have been consistently estimated at 16% to 19% 
higher than Non-Big 8 prices.
If there are diseconomies of scale suffered by small (large) auditors 
in audits of large (small) auditees the question arises as to why do we 
observe large (small) auditees using small (large) auditors? One explanation
could be that inefficient producers are observed in the short run but in the
long run these inefficient producers would be driven out of the market to
be replaced by more efficient producers [Francis and Stokes, 1986].
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Alterna t ive ly ,  if for  some large (small) aud i t ees  o the r  monitor ing mechanisms 
eff ic ient ly  subs t i tu te  for  e x te rn a l  audi t ing at  the margin,  then these firms 
may be able to e ff ic ien t ly  ut i l ise small ( large) audi tors.  Moreover,  costs of 
switching are  impor tan t  in the r e ten t ion /switch decision where  audi tee
a t t r ib u t e s  change and the dist inct ion be tw een  Big and Small in the audi tee  
and aud i to r  marke t  is at  the margin,  a rb i t ra ry .
V CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper  has been to provide an explana t ion of the
na tu re  of d i ff e rences  in the audi t products supplied by audit  firms.
Relying upon the explana t ion  tha t  observed special isat ion by audi tee  firms 
in product  m arke ts  is a funct ion of the contracts  w r i t t e n  to combine factors
of product ion, and since audi t ing is one such factor ,  we have argued that  
the n a tu re  of the audit  product  will der ive many of i ts a t t r i b u t e s  from the 
na tu re  of the aud i tee  f i rm’s p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions. The demand
for aud i to r  con tract ing  competence and technical competence (i.e., the demand 
for an audi t  technology)  was argued to der ive  from the demand by audi tee  
firms for monitor ing and a rb i t ra t ing  the production of account ing information 
to reduce the costs  of contract ing  through the firm. In addit ion,  the
demand for  independence is der ived from the a rb i t r a t ion  demand,  and
to g e th e r  with audi to r  proximity and n o n - a u d i t  services,  these  product
a t t r ib u t e s  are  demanded to reduce the costs of contract ing  by aud i t ee  firms.
The separa t ion  of  the product  a t t r ib u t e s  within the audi t product
implies that  the au d i to r ’s production funct ion is mult idimensional and that  
audit  qual i ty  can be r e l a t e d  to increases  in the quan t i ty  of one or more
product  a t t r ibu tes .  The in te rdependence  be tw e en  the product  a t t r ib u t e s
implies tha t  a change in the mix of  f ixed and var iab le  factors  in the
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investment in any attribute (or a combination of attributes) may have spillover e ffects  to the other attributes.Auditee assurances of the audit quality resulting from auditor investments emerges via brand names. We attempted to reconcile the approaches taken in the literature to explain brand name reputations and the evidence on audit pricing with the structure of the market for audits implied by our propositions.
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FOOTNOTES
See for  example [Burton and Roberts ,  1967; C a rp e n te r  and St rawser ,  
1971; Bedingfield and Loeb, 1974; Chow and Rice, 1982; De Angelo, 
1982; Nichols and Smith, 1983; Palmrose,  1984; Schwartz  and Menon, 
1985; Healy & Lys, 1986; De Fond, 1987; Danos and Eichenseher,
1988; Williams, 1988; Johnson and Lys, 1988).
Audi to rs  are  dis t inguished by size d if fe rences  such as ‘Big E igh t ’ and 
‘Small’ while aud i t ees  are  iden t i f ied  as ‘l a rge ’ or ‘small’ (for example,
on the basis of mean asset  size). Di ffe rences in prices (or the lack
of  them) a re  iden t i f ied  b e tw e en  ‘Big E igh t ’ and ‘Small’ audi tors  
[Simunic, 1980; Francis,  1984; Firth ,  1985; Simon, 1985; Palmrose,  1986; 
Francis  and Stokes,  1986; Francis and Simon, 1987], and within the
‘Big E igh t ’ auditors  [Simunic, 1980], The d i ff e rences  are  observed 
across countr ies .  Fi r th  [1985] used New Zea land  da ta ;  Francis [1984] 
and Francis  and Stokes [1986] Aus t ra l ian  da ta ,  while the remainder  
of  the s tudies  l is ted above used U.S. da ta .
For  example,  in the U.S. the Metcalf  Commit tee  [1977],  the Cohen
Commission and the Dingell  Commit tee  have all inves t iga ted
competi t ion  in the audi t industry.  Among o the r  things concentra t ion,  
increased competi t ion  and price cu t t ing were iden t i f ied  as leading to
an erosion in the qual i ty  of audits.  For  a review of these 
arguments ,  see Dopuch and Simunic [1982].
Con trac t ing  costs include costs incurred by buyers  and sel lers  in
searching for a pa r ty  in te r e s t e d  in contract ing,  nego t i a t ing  the
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contract,  executing the contract in an acceptable form, monitoring and
enforcing performance and making the contracted payoffs  [Ball, 1988, 
p. 411.
Alchian [1984, p. 361 defines the quas i - ren t  specific to a resource as 
the return  on the investment cost that is non-sa lvagable if the other 
resources to which it is specifically dependent  in the coalition, 
disappear.
In this sense the firm holds no general assets as firms will only 
contract  with factors (and vice versa) when there is, ex ante, the
possibility of value added. This departs  from Alchian’s [1984, p. 39]
defini tion of a firm. Alchian [p. 39] in defining the firm s ta tes  "A 
firm is a coalition of interspecific resources owned in common, and 
some generalized i n p u t s , (emphasis added). Implied by this 
defini t ion is that "generalized inputs" have no specificity. However, 
an apparent  inconsistency emerges with Alchian’s at tempt  to
operat ionalize specificity with respect to particular  contracts  (e.g., 
with labor). Alchian argues [p. 41] (with) "generalized labor ... no 
one has significant effect on the salvageable value of any of the 
coali tion’s assets, even though the set of laborers ... as a set would 
seriously affect  the coalition value if they all refused to deal with 
the coalition" (emphasis Alchian’s). Implied now is that generalized
labor is of low specificity.
See Ball [1988, p.2] for other  major contributors to the l i te rature in
this area.
38
The operat ional  form of this proposition has appeared elsewhere in 
the l i terature.  For example, Spence [1974] (although not in this 
context) suggests some details  of the mechanisms by which the
representat ion of economies of scale in contracting may emerge for 
the firm. Spence argues [p. 1121 that firms are mechanisms for 
screening and monitoring suppliers more efficiently than consumers 
where firms have information advantages on suppliers’ ability to 
perform certain tasks. See also Klein, Crawford and Alchian [1978, 
p. 315].
It is important to note that a firm’s economies of scale in 
contract ing are different  from economies of scale in production. 
Economies of scale in contracting may exist independently of 
economies in production and vice versa. Furthermore,  economies of 
scale in production are available to both consumers and firms
[Riordan and Williamson, 1985].
This proposition has been recognised by many researchers.  For 
example Jensen and Meckling [1976] argue that  managers have 
incentives to provide financial s ta tements and to have their accuracy 
test if ied by an independent outside auditor. See Watts and
Zimmerman [1986] for a review of the l i te rature that posits
accounting and external  auditing as integral  to contracting through 
firms.
11 Other mechanisms could be used by firms to reveal the sta te  of 
o u t c o m e s  of p r o d u c t i o n - i n v e s t m e n t  decisions, e.g., c o n t r a c t s  with labor 
on piece rates,  and progress payments to  construct ion contractors on
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a percentage of completion basis where revelat ion of the s ta tes  is 
dependent  on the report of (for example) an engineer. Moreover, it
cannot be concluded that the accounting technology is more efficient 
because of the frequency of its use, as much of present  accounting 
practice is regulation induced. However there  is evidence that,  in
the absence of regulation, accounting technologies are used voluntarily 
(e.g.,[Holthausen and Leftwich, 19831) and vary in response to contract 
types [Zimmer, 1986; Whittred, 19871.
Although not argued from within the framework Ijiri [1975, p. 37] 
offers  some insights into this process:
"... the value of a firm is a subjective measure not because it is
not registered in external  reality, but because there is a wide 
variety of figures that are assigned by persons measuring the 
value".
See, for example, Leftwich, [19831; Whittred and Zimmer, [19861. 
Watts and Zimmerman, [1986] provide a survey of evidence of the 
use of accounting numbers in firm contracts.
An outcome of this proposition is that the ex ante contracting
explanations for accounting choice (for example, [Zimmer, 1986; 
Whittred, 1987]) and the ex post opportunist ic behaviour explanations 
(for a review see [Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983]) are applicable 
only in so far as s ta tes  (including opportunistic behaviour by
claimholders) are not fully anticipated prior to performance of the 
contracts. With positive contracting costs, full ant icipation of s tates
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is not always expected. Fama [19801 and Diamond [1985] recognize
the existence of al ternat ive  mechanisms to control ex post 
(unexpected) opportunism in labour markets  and debt markets
respectively. However,  the argument here would predict that the 
extent  to which control of unexpected opportunism is left to ex post 
sett l ing in a market is inversely rela ted  to the specificity of a 
factor  in a coalition.
Monitoring is used here to encompass the act ivit ies  of fraud 
detect ion and prevention and those act ivit ies identif ied by Alchian
and Demsetz’ [1972, p. 782] description of the role of monitoring in
the firm: to measure output performance, apportion rewards and 
observe behaviour of inputs).
Other monitoring and arb i trat ing mechanisms do exist and can be 
used by the firm e.g. internal  auditors [Maher and Cheh, 1985], 
outside directors, compensation committees, internal  control systems, 
courts of law. Again it cannot be concluded that  external  auditing
is the more efficient monitoring and arb i trat ing mechanism because of 
its frequency of use, as like accounting, much of present  auditing
practice is regulation induced. However,  there is evidence that,  in
the absence of regulation, external  auditing is used (e.g. [Watts, 1977; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Chow, 1982]).
This demand for monitoring appears to be aligned with descriptions 
of demand for control (see e.g. [Simunic, 1980; Dopuch and Simunic,
1982; Simunic and Stein, 1987]).
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Williamson [1975, p. 31], Cheung [1983, p. 8] and Ball [1988, p .U]  
use arb i t rat ion in similar contexts  to the one presented  here. Ball 
also refers  to the arb i trat ion function as an auditing technology. 
The term audit technology is used la ter  in this paper to embrace 
contracting and technical competence. The demand for arbitrat ion
appears to be aligned with descriptions of demand for credibility (see 
e.g. [Dopuch and Simunic, 1982; Simunic and Stein, 19871).
The application of the principle of material i ty by the auditor is
relevant  to both the monitoring and arb i trat ing role. In monitoring 
the revelat ion of s tates  the auditor  is required to make judgements 
on deviat ions between the revealed s ta tes  and the expected 
revelat ions given particular  s tates  have occurred. Within a monitoring 
role the auditor  must make judgements on the extent  to which errors 
affect payoffs to the contracting part ies  given the accounting
technology has been correctly applied. When unanticipated events 
arise the auditor must make judgements within the arbi t rat ion  role 
about the extent  to which payoffs to any party are unsett led.
Cheung [1983, p. 81 provides an example which demonstrates both the 
difficulty (cost) of measuring the Marginal Value Product of each
factor and the way that the problem can be resolved through 
arbi tration.  He describes ... "riverboat pulling in China before the 
communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along the 
shore towing a good-sized wooden boat. The unique interest  of this 
example is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a 
monitor to whip them. The point here is that even if every puller
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were perfect ly ‘honest’, it would still be too costly to measure the 
ef fort  each has contributed to the movement of the boat, but to 
choose a different  measurement agreeable to all would be so difficult 
that  the arb i trat ion of an agent is essential." The whip handler  is 
able to recognize the specific resources brought to the coalition by 
each of the boat pullers and reacts  to particular  observed states 
accordingly and so will know which of the pullers to hit as (say) 
marshes and hills are encountered.
In some countries, e.g. United Kingdom and Australia,  audit opinions 
are couched in terms of "truth and fairness". Truth in the sense 
above means that actual revelat ion of an expected s ta te  is in accord 
with the expected revelation given that s ta t e  occurs. Truth is 
rela ted  to the monitoring role of the auditor  and truth in any
absolute sense is not implied. Similarly we do not at tach any
regulatory meaning to descriptions such as "subject to ... in the
argument above. It is not surprising, however, that t ighter
specifications of "truth" and "f airness" have failed to emerge in
regulations applicable across all auditee firms.
This is consistent with the general  model specified by Watts and 
Zimmerman [1986]. They argue that  the probability of an auditor 
reporting a breach conditional upon any breach occurring depends on 
the joint probability that  the auditor  discovers the breach and 
having discovered a breach, reports  it. The first probability reflects 
competence of the auditor while the second reflects  the independence
of the auditor.
Financing contracts which emerge in the firm do so, at least in part,  
because of the control (governance) they can bring in protecting 
claimholder payoffs. There is a growing body of evidence which
recognizes the supply of governance as a potential  determinant  of 
capital s tructure.  For example, the control functions of debt are 
reviewed in Jensen [1986]. For other  applications consistent with 
this theme see Thatcher [1985]. Furthermore it is not suggested 
that each of the contracts  associated with financing investments relies 
on the same levels of auditor competence in monitoring and 
arbi trating.  To the extent  that the claimholders are able to
anticipate opportunist ic behaviour by other  claimholders (including 
managers) and have an efficient mechanism to control that behaviour 
(e.g., personal guarantees by directors, internal  audits and external  
directors)  external  auditor competence is less valuable.
This does not imply that audit firms offer  uniformity with respect to
contracting competence and the other audit product demands of 
auditees.
For example, Francis and Wilson [1988] argue that  as the diversity 
of shareholding increases the demand for auditor  independence
increases.
A potential ly anomalous observation,  given this argument, is the 
provision of non-audit  services to auditees by audit firms that are 
not the incumbent auditors. An auditee may exploit the comparative 
advantage of particular audit firms with respect to providing non­
audit services relating to marginal changes in the audi tee’s
44
p r o d u c t ion - inves tm e n t  decisions. However ,  given this demand it does  
not  follow tha t  the provider  of these n o n - a u d i t  services  has 
con tract ing  competence sufficient  for conduct  of the audit  across the 
en t i r e  range  of exis t ing and an t i c ipa ted  p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  
decisions of  the audi tee .
The types of p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions may be highly corre la ted  
with a pa r t icula r  output  c lassi ficat ion (e.g., industry type)  but this 
need not  necessar ily a lways be the case. This proposi t ion s tands in 
con tr as t  with any argument  tha t  there  is a t r a d e - o f f  be tw een  gains 
f rom specializat ion and por tfo l io  divers i f icat ion.  It has been argued 
above that  gains f rom contract ing  specializat ions explain both audi tee  
p roduc t ion - inves tm en t  decisions and (as a consequence)  audi to r  
technologies.  The gains f rom por tfo l io  divers i f i cat ion  come not from 
a decision by the audi tor  to hold aud i t ees  across industr ies ,  but 
because inves tment  decisions and contract  type(s) tha t  the audi t firm 
specializes in, exist  across industries . Conversely,  con trac t s  will d i f f e r  
b e tw e en  aud i t ee  firms within an industry.  For  example,  contract s  
descr ibed on the basis of a firm being in the ‘Oil and Gas’ industry 
would be expected  to d i ff e r  depending on w h e th e r  the firm is a 
producer  or explorer.  A competing explana t ion  is tha t  if audi tor  
r e tu rns  are  t ied to audi tee  re tu rns  then observed  divers i f ica t ion by 
audi to rs  across aud i tee  industr ies  is a mechanism to reduce portfol io  
risk. This argument  is not  considered fur ther .
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Where independence reputat ion is not valued by auditees,  the
incumbent audit firms are expected to be small with s ta f f  responsible 
for providing both audit and non-audit  services.
Simunic and Stein have argued:
"With d if ferentia ted  audit services, quality of service can be compared 
using any dimension of interest  if the quantit ies  of the suppressed 
characterist ics  are at least equal. For example, an audit service
described by the vector (2, 8, 5} (for a set of characterist ics) is of 
higher quality than the service {2, 5, 5}, and of lower quality than
the service {2, 9, 5}, but not comparable in quality to the service {1, 
10, 5}" [Simunic and Stein, 1987, p. 10].
Assurances are difficult to sell to claimholders on the basis of 
auditor  promises that audits are in accord with generally accepted 
auditing standards [Simunic and Stein, 1987, pp. 18-19].
Eichenseher and Danos [1981] develop a model to explain auditor 
concentrat ion in a given industry which argues there is expertise
related economies of scale for auditors in dealing with the regulatory 
complexity faced by auditees. Audit firms make investments in 
expert ise rela ted to the regulations and once this expert ise is 
acquired, additional auditees can be audited at lower marginal cost 
than the cost to audit the first (or first few) auditees. They find 
empirical support for their argument in tests  of association between 
concentrat ion and two sources of regulatory complexity. They [Danos 
and Eichenseher, 1988] provide an explanation and evidence for
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bounds to this process (i.e., at the limit why one audit firm does not 
audit an entire industry) induced by the aversion of a auditee to 
accept an auditor  of a close competitor.
Francis and Wilson [1988] summarise the auditing l i te ra ture  using this 
brand name classification. See also Ettredge,  et al., [1988].
This recognition can arise through sponsoring conferences, producing 
industry publications, and advertising.
Industry specialisation is an output classification proxying for 
competence in a class of production-investment decisions [inputs].
This is not to argue that smaller audit firms could not offer  larger  
quanti t ies  of the audit product at tr ibutes.  All audit firms are bound 
by registrat ion requirements to offer  minimum levels of competence 
and independence. Smaller firms could offer  large quantit ies  of audit 
product a t tr ibu tes  in the short run by injecting additional variable 
factors or acquiring additional fixed factors to match the larger 
firms. But their  audit product would not be competit ively priced 
given their  smaller auditee base. See a fur ther  discussion of this 
point in section IV.
36 For the audit firm there appears to be no short run method of 
acquiring reputat ion (with the possible exception of merging with high 
reputat ion firms).
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The economics of franchising is considered in more de ta i l  by
Mathewson and Winter  [1985] and Nor ton  [1988].
Francis  and Simon [1987] also show the Big 8 higher  price exis ts
with respec t  to both the second t ie r  nat ional  audit  firms and the 
local / regional  audit  firms. There  is no evidence of a price
d i f f e re n t i a l  b e tw e en  the s e c o n d - t i e r  firms and the local/regional. audit  
firms.
F i r t h ’s [1985] New Zealand study did not  find a significant
d i f fe rence  in the pr ices  a lthough this has been a t t r ib u t e d  to
ins t i tu t iona l  res t r i c t ions  in the use of Big 8 account ing firm names in
New Zea land  pr ior  to 1983. The res tr i c t ions  suggest the Big 8 were 
not  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  producers f rom the N on-Big  8.
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